This article tests the hypothesis that the opportunistic manipulation of financial accounts by mayors increases their chances of re-election. Working with a large and detailed dataset comprising all Portuguese mainland municipalities, which covers the municipal elections that took place from 1979 to 2001, we clearly show that increases in investment expenditures and changes in the composition of spending favouring highly visible items are associated with higher vote percentages for incumbent mayors seeking re-election. Our results also indicate that the political payoff to opportunistic spending increased after democracy became well-established in the country.
Introduction
The objective of the present article is to determine whether opportunistic mayors can increase their chances of re-election by generating political business cycles around elections. We test the hypothesis that pre-electoral increases in municipal expenditures and changes in their composition, favouring items most visible to or preferred by the electorate, are associated with higher vote percentages for the incumbent mayor.
Research is conducted over a dataset comprising all the Portuguese mainland municipalities, from 1979 to 2001.
In previous work, Veiga and Veiga (2004c) found strong evidence of political budgetary cycles in Portuguese municipalities. Their analysis reveals that deficits, and expenditures, particularly investment, increase significantly in election years and, in some cases, in the year before. They also showed that electoral cycles were stronger for investment items highly visible to the electorate, for example, construction spending on public infra-structure. Given these results, it would also be interesting to investigate: (1) if voters reward politicians' opportunistic spending policies, or punish them, as suggested by Peltzman (1992) ; (2) if the items targeted by mayors' electoral policies are those that generate more votes. Additionally, because democracy was reestablished in Portugal in 1974, during our sample period the country has evolved from a "new" to an "established" democracy. This makes Portugal an appropriate laboratory for analyzing if the determinants of electoral results change as a democracy matures. In the article, we also test if the popularity of the national government conditions local electoral results, and whether time in office decreases incumbents' popularity.
The international literature on vote and popularity functions is already quite extensive (Paldam, 2004) . However, most of the research concentrates on national governments and the Portuguese case is clearly under researched. At the local level, there is only Costa (1998) , who analysed the 1989 and 1993 municipal elections. At the national level, Veiga and Veiga (2004a) , and Veiga and Veiga (2004b) estimate, respectively, popularity functions for the four main Portuguese political entities and vote intentions functions for the main political parties in the country.
Use of data for Portuguese municipalities is also motivated by the following reasons. First, we have very detailed data on local governments' financial accounts.
Second, the mayor is a principal decision-maker in the allocation of resources and the distribution of investment in the municipality. Third, the institutional structure of local governments and the policy instruments available are the same for all localities, making this panel preferable to one composed of several countries. Finally, election dates are fixed and defined exogenously from the perspective of the local authorities, and all municipalities have elections on the same day.
This article is organized as follows. The next section presents some background information on Portuguese municipalities. Section 3 describes the data sources and section 4 the empirical model. Results are discussed in section 5. Finally, section 6 reports the conclusions.
Portuguese municipalities: brief characterization
This section presents some background information on Portuguese municipalities. Democracy was re-established in Portugal by the bloodless military coup of April 25, 1974, which put an end to 48 years of dictatorship. Portuguese municipalities were formally established in the Constitution of 1976 and the first municipal elections took place in December of the same year. Portuguese local governments are responsible for improving their populations' well-being, promoting social and economic development, territory organization, and for supplying local public goods (water and sewage, energy, transportation, housing, healthcare, education, culture, sports, defence of the environment, and protection of the civilian population). Votes are then transformed into mandates using the Hondt method, and the mayor is the first candidate from the list that receives the most votes. Part of the Municipal Assembly is elected directly by voters while the remaining members are the presidents of the councils of the freguesias that belong to the municipality. 3 The Municipal Assembly approves the general framework for local policies, while the Town Council, which holds the executive power, is responsible for its elaboration and implementation. The mayor is the president of the Town Council and has a prominent role in the executive.
Budgeting rules and institutions are the same for all Portuguese mainland municipalities, although the law regulating local public finances changed during the period considered. 4 Municipalities are financially autonomous. They have their own employees and assets, and they define the local budget and the plan of activities without a requirement of authorization from a higher-ranked authority. As part of the general government sector, local authorities are, however, subject to several control mechanisms by central government agencies. These limit their access to revenues as well as their expenditure choices.
It is worth noting that election dates are defined exogenously from the perspective of the local authorities and that during our sample period there was no legal restriction to the number of terms a mayor could stand for re-election. Since the re- 1979 , 1982 , 1985 , 1989 , 1993 , 1997 and 2001 , and in October 2005 .
Data sources
The dataset is composed of data on a set of political, financial and economic variables for the 278 Portuguese mainland municipalities. Due to the restrictions imposed by data availability, the election years covered in this study are 1979, 1982, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997 and 2001. 5 Since this article tries to determine whether or not political opportunism of mayors pays off, only the cases in which they run for reelection are considered. The erosion of the mayor's popularity as he/she stays longer in power is accounted for by including a variable, Years President, that counts the number of years during which the incumbent has remained in power (a negative estimated coefficient is expected for this variable). Mayors' popularity tends to decrease with time in office because the policy actions, even if supported by most of the electorate, will tend to alienate some voters, who will then support the opposition (Mueller, 1970, and Frey and Schneider, 1978) . Voter support may also decay when mayors fail to deliver what they promised during the electoral campaigns (Mueller, 1970 It is also possible that the votes for an incumbent mayor whose political party is in charge of the national government are affected by the popularity of the latter. That is, the electorate may also wish to reward, or punish, the national government in second order elections. Carsey and Wright (1998, p. 995) Since voters tend to punish the national government for bad economic outcomes, 10 higher inflation should lead to lower percentages of votes for the incumbent mayors of the government's party (a negative coefficient is expected for this interaction variable).
The first group of tests of the hypothesis that opportunism pays off use data on more aggregated accounts, such as budget balances, taxes and total expenditures. We then test the hypothesis using more detailed data. First, we split expenditures into current and capital. Second, we estimate models for total investment expenditures (the main component of capital expenditures). Finally, its components and sub-components are also analysed. This very detailed analysis, that considers all types of investment expenditures, allows for the identification of those for which pre-electoral manipulation would increase the percentage of votes for the incumbent. That is, we are able to identify the types of expenditures that opportunistic mayors should target and to check whether or not they correspond to those for which Veiga and Veiga (2004c) found evidence of political business cycles.
Ultimately, votes should be driven by the incumbent's performance and not necessarily by the magnitude or the composition of expenditures. Since there is no data on the quality of the services provided by the Portuguese municipalities, we use the few measures of municipal economic performance that are available. Thus, the final step of the empirical analysis is to control for the evolution of employment, 11 wages and purchasing power in each municipality. Descriptive statistics for all the variables mentioned above are presented in Table 1 .
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[Insert Table 1 
about here]
Two empirical models will be estimated in order to check if opportunism pays off. In the first, the levels of the variables that may be the object of opportunism in the election year and in the two previous years are included along with the political variables referred to above. The empirical model can be specified as follows: 1997 , 1993 , 1989 , 1985 , 1982 , 1979 275 ,.. ν i is the individual effect of municipality i, ε it is the error term, α, φ and γ are parameters and β 1 , β 2 and β 3 are vectors of parameters to be estimated. Evidence that opportunism pays off would be consistent with a positive and statistically significant β 1, eventually, a positive and statistically significant β 2 , and a negative or statistically insignificant β 3 .
The second model uses the term mean and the percentage deviation of the level in the election year relative to the term mean of the variables included in vector X. The empirical model can be specified as follows: 1997 , 1993 , 1989 , 1985 , 1982 , 1979 275 ,.. 
where Xtm is a vector of term means of the variables included in X, Xdev is a vector of the percentage deviations of their election year values from the term means, and all the remaining variables and parameters are defined as in equation (1). Evidence that opportunism pays off would be consistent with a positive and statistically significant β 2.
13 Since the first terms were only three-years long, when working with the full sample it is not possible to include the level of X three years before elections, because in those cases it would be an election year. That value will be included when working just with the most recent elections.
A positive and statistically significant β 1 means that greater average values of the X variables over a term are associated with greater percentages of votes.
Empirical results
The estimation results of the panel data models described in the previous section, controlling for municipality fixed effects, 14 are shown in Table 2 . 15 T-statistics are presented between parentheses and the degree of statistical significance is signalled with asterisks. The number of observations, municipalities and elections, and the adjusted R squared are reported at the foot of the table.
In column 1 of Table 2 , we report the results of the estimation of the model of equation (1) is not the first lag of Votes (their correlation is around 75%). Thus, the implementation of the Arellano and Bond (1991) difference GMM estimator for linear dynamic panel data models would not be appropriate. Nevertheless, we estimated it just as a robustness check, and the results (available upon request) were similar to those presented in this paper. 16 For each municipality, all fiscal variables were divided by the consumer price index for the base year (1995) and, then, by its population. Thus, they are expressed in euros (of 1995) per capita. The budget balance, based on public accounting, is calculated according to the methodology of the General Direction of the Budget (Direcção Geral do Orçamento) of the Ministry of Finance, which excludes the transactions in financial assets and liabilities from the totals of revenues and expenditures. 17 As indicated in equation (1), we started with the estimation of a model which also included the values of the three fiscal variables one and two years before the elections. Then, these lagged values were sequentially excluded from the model when they turned out not statistically significant.
Party*Inflation Rate, indicating that when inflation is high, mayors that belong to the prime minister's party tend to lose votes.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
The results of the estimation of the model of equation (2) In the estimations of columns 3 and 4, the dummy variable Government's Party was interacted with Government Popularity instead of with the inflation rate. As expected, this interaction variable is statistically significant, with a positive sign. Now, Total Expenditures in the election year are highly statistically significant (column 3), indicating that greater expenditures lead to higher percentages of votes. 18 The difference of results when comparing to those of column 1 may be explained by the fact that in the estimation of column 3 only the last 4 elections are considered, while that of column 1 considers all 7 elections that took place during the sample period.
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In order to study the possibility that opportunism worked better in the most recent elections, the sample was split in two: one sub-sample covers the first four elections (1979, 1982, 1985 and 1989) , while the other covers the last three elections is both worthwhile to spend more on average over the term, and to increase expenditures in the election year relative to the previous years of the same electoral cycle.
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The fact that opportunism paid off better in the most recent Portuguese municipal elections contradicts the results of Brender and Drazen (2005) that indicate that political business cycles tend to work in new democracies but not in established ones. That is, our results imply that they worked better as the Portuguese democracy became more established (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) than in the first elections after the restoration of democracy in 1974. A possible explanation for this result is that, as democracy matured, not only voters learned about the democratic system; politicians may also have acquired more knowledge on how to implement electoral politics. It is worth mentioning that according to Alt and Lassen (2006) , conditioning on the degree of fiscal policy transparency, electoral cycles also exist in advanced industrialized economies.
Therefore, in line with Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990) Concerning the political variables, our results are consistent with popularity erosion over time spent in office, with the hypothesis that the popularity of the national government affects the votes obtained by incumbent mayors of the same party, and with the view that the party holding the national government may also be subject to evaluation by voters in second order (municipal, in the present case) elections.
When checking if opportunism by mayors has always led to more votes for the incumbent, we found out that it had little or no effects in the elections of 1979 to 1989.
But, results for the last three elections in our sample (1993, 1997, and 2001) were stronger than for the entire sample, showing that it was in this period that opportunism paid off better. The fact that opportunistic spending was more vote-productive after Portugal became an established democracy than it had been when democracy was newly established contradicts Brender and Drazen (2005) , who concluded that political budget cycles happen in new but not in established democracies. This may be a result of a lack of transparency regarding local fiscal policies combined with the acquisition of knowledge by politicians, as democracy matured.
Electoral manipulation can also be accomplished by altering the composition of Notes: Panel regressions, for election years, controlling for municipality fixed effects. Votes, the dependent variable, was defined as the percentage of votes obtained by the incumbent. Models estimated with a constant. T-statistics based on heteroskedastic consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. Notes: -Panel regressions, for election years, controlling for municipality fixed effects; -Votes, the dependent variable, was defined as the percentage of votes obtained by the incumbent; -Models estimated with a constant; -T-statistics based on heteroskedastic consistent standard errors are in parenthesis; -Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. Notes: Panel regressions, for election years, controlling for municipality fixed effects. Votes, the dependent variable, was defined as the percentage of votes obtained by the incumbent. Models estimated with a constant. T-statistics based on heteroskedastic consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. Notes: -Panel regressions, for election years, controlling for municipality fixed effects; -Votes, the dependent variable, was defined as the percentage of votes obtained by the incumbent. Models estimated with a constant; -T-statistics based on heteroskedastic consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. Notes: -Panel regressions, for election years, controlling for municipality fixed effects; -Votes, the dependent variable, was defined as the percentage of votes obtained by the incumbent; -Models estimated with a constant; -T-statistics based on heteroskedastic consistent standard errors are in parenthesis; -Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%.
